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Washington and New Delhi have long celebrated the U.S.–India partnership as the “best” and “closest” of the post–Cold War era. Now, after more than 25 years of carefully managed diplomacy and defense ties, the relationship between the world’s two largest democracies is at a critical inflection point.

“The trust is gone,” Evan Feigenbaum, a senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace who focuses on South Asia, told Foreign Policy. “We’re in a situation in the U.S.-India relationship where the premises and assumptions of the last 25 years … have just come completely unraveled.”

The turning point came earlier this year, when Trump announced across-the-board tariffs on Indian goods over New Delhi’s refusal to reduce its imports of Russian oil, despite the war in Ukraine. The tariff, which began at 25 percent, is set to increase to 50 percent on August 27. The administration hoped that the move would encourage India to stop buying from Russia. Instead, it seems to have reinforced Delhi’s drift toward Moscow — and even Beijing.

In recent weeks, India’s national security adviser traveled to Moscow, and Foreign Minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar held high-level talks there. Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi just wrapped up a meeting in New Delhi. Prime Minister Narendra Modi is also preparing for his first visit to China in more than seven years, and Russian President Vladimir Putin is expected to host him in Moscow before the end of the year. Analysts say the moves by India are more than symbolic.

Indian public opinion is also souring on what many see as U.S. meddling in India’s sovereign policy decisions. “They’re signaling very clearly that they view that as interference in India’s foreign policy, and they are not going to put up with it,” Feigenbaum said.

Indian state-run refiners, which paused Russian oil imports early in the war due to U.S. pressure, resumed purchases after discounts on Russian crude widened to between six and seven percent. The move to Russian oil has paid off for Moscow. Russian oil now makes up 35 percent of Indian imports, compared to 0.2 percent before the Ukraine war. Russia is seizing the opportunity to expand its offers. “Moscow is ready to continue the deliveries of crude oil, oil products, thermal and coking coal,” said Deputy Prime Minister Denis Manturov. Russia is also eyeing new opportunities. “We see potential for the export of Russian LNG,” Manturov added.

Push and Pull

Michael Kugelman, senior associate for South Asia at the Washington-based Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, said that Trump’s tariffs were not the only cause of India’s drift away from Washington and toward Moscow and Beijing. “We’ve seen indications for almost a year of India wanting to ease tensions with China and strengthen relations, mainly for economic reasons. But the Trump administration’s policies have made India want to move even more quickly,” Kugelman told FP.

Some of New Delhi’s moves are part of a larger diplomatic dance. “I think some of it is performative, to signal the freedom of action and independence of India’s foreign policy,” Feigenbaum said. “India is going to double down on some aspects of its economic and defense relationship with Russia — and those parts are not performative.”

India has already been seeking to wean itself off Russian arms before the Ukraine war, instead buying more from the United States, France, and Israel. But as soon as the invasion began, trade in energy with Russia boomed. Kugelman said, “In a way, it’s a vindication of the thinking in India that the U.S. can’t be trusted, whereas Russia can — because Russia is always going to be there for India no matter what.”

Modi has also been using the opportunity to burnish his credentials at home as a defender of Indian sovereignty and independence, at a time when domestic political winds matter for Modi as he seeks to consolidate power. He has defended his stance as one in which the protection of the livelihoods of farmers, small businesses, and young workers is the top priority. Kugelman noted that Modi had already given in to Washington earlier on. India has made concessions, including allowing tariff reductions on certain products and agreeing to bring back migrant workers. Because of those concessions, India needs to be careful about signaling further willingness to bend. This is one reason there was no trade deal — Modi put his foot down,” he said.

In Washington, the anger is growing. “India has behaved in a way that is frankly opportunistic and deeply corrosive to the relationship, increasing its reliance on Russia in an unprovoked and barbaric war,” wrote Peter Navarro, former head of Trump’s White House National Trade Council, in the Financial Times on August 12. Navarro argued that only tariffs would make India “feel the pain where it hurts — its access to U.S. markets — even as it seeks to cut off the financial lifeline it has extended to Russia’s war effort.”

Those high points have all seen the United States and India rising above differences that might threaten the larger relationship. In 2008, the United States and India inked a civilian nuclear agreement in which Washington agreed to share nuclear fuel and technology with New Delhi, which had not signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty. At the time, the two countries managed to compartmentalize their differences, and the issues that came up never threatened to rock the overall boat.